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Abstract 
Our empirical analysis utilises panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 34 OECD countries into 
45 ACP countries over the period 2000-2017 to consider the role of PTAs in attracting FDI.  We 
control for policies relating to trade, taxes and investment, along with other explanatory 
variables identified in the literature. We conclude the prevalence of market seeking FDI in the 
ACP region, with a role for regional integration in accessing surrounding market potential. We 
find no significant effect of PTAs on FDI in the Caribbean, while in Africa, the effects depend 
on the presence of a bilateral BIT.  
JEL Classification: F14, F21, R12 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Preferential Trading Arrangements, Regional 
Integration 
*Corresponding author: Gulasekaran Rajaguru, Email: rgulasek@bond.edu.au, Tel: +61 7
55952049.
Acknowledgements: We thank the Editor, an anonymous referee, Neil Foster-McGregor, 
Martin Richardson and the participants of 2017 Australian Conference of Economists for their 
useful comments and suggestions. 
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Open Economies Review.  
The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11079-019-09532-y.
Page 2 of 27 
1. Introduction
In this study we extend the empirical analysis of Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) to 
include their impact on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The motivation to explore PTA 
effects beyond trade arises from two distinct developments. The first is the dramatic increase 
in the number and geographical spread of PTAs. According to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the total number of PTAs exceeded 300 at the end of 2013 with a noticeable 
acceleration from 1990 onwards.  Alongside this, the average number of participants in each 
PTA has increased from just two in 1990 to twelve in 2010. The second development is the 
extension of coverage of PTAs to include ‘deep integration’ provisions, which cover, for 
example, foreign investment, employment, competition policy, dispute settlement and 
standards.  Such extensions indicate that PTAs’ objectives go beyond trade alone which 
motivates our exploration of their effects on FDI.     
Our empirical focus is the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, a grouping created by 
the Georgetown Agreement of 1975 and comprising 79 states.1 Given the significant 
development constraints this group faces, FDI provides an important development opportunity 
(Naude & Krugell 2007, Bankole & Adewuyi 2013) and is often a motivation for PTA 
membership (Buthe & Milner, 2014). The ACP groups’ heavy reliance on funds from abroad 
is well recognised.  Official development assistance has declined over the years (Amendolagine 
et al, 2013), which has prompted efforts to obtain a more stable and long-term capital inflow 
through FDI (Asiedu, 2002).  
The potential benefits of FDI are well known.  It can, with the appropriate policy environment, 
serve as a catalyst for the development of local enterprise (OECD, 2002).  It enables host 
countries to achieve investment levels beyond their own domestic saving and is an important 
source of modern technology (Sichei & Kinyondo 2012).  It can create employment, enhance 
productivity and managerial skills (Asiedu 2004) and increase competition (Gastanaga et al, 
1998). However, the ability of a host to attract and benefit from FDI hinges on many factors, 
including effective regional integration (African Economic Outlook, 2016) and strong linkages 
between foreign affiliates and domestic firms (Amendolagine et al 2013, Markusen & Venables 
1999).  
1 Appendix Table A1 lists the ACP countries. 
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PTAs can play a role in attracting FDI through several channels (Medvedev, 2011). Investment 
provisions in the PTA itself provide a direct channel, while provisions in related areas, such as 
competition policy and product standards, can be indirect channels. The international locking-
in of policy reforms via PTAs increases the credibility of host government’s commitments to 
reform, thereby reducing investment risks (Buthe & Milner 2014). Greater regional integration 
through PTAs creates larger markets that may attract market-seeking and export platform FDI 
(Gnimassoun, 2019).   
To date the ACP group’s record in attracting foreign investment has been disappointing. In 
2017, Africa attracted only 3 percent of global FDI, the Caribbean 0.4 percent and the Pacific 
just 0.1 percent.  Of the FDI inflows into developing countries in 2017, the ACP group 
accounted for only 7.2 percent (6.2, 0.7 and 0.3 percent, respectively)2.  The ratio of FDI to 
GDP varies within and across the ACP sub-groups as shown in Figure 1. Nevertheless, FDI 
remains an important source of foreign capital for this group, and both the IMF and World 
Bank have advised policy makers to pursue market liberalisation and other reforms to attract 
more FDI. 
A common perception is that FDI in the ACP countries, particularly in Africa, is largely 
attracted by natural resource endowments.  Although this remains true for some African 
countries, in others there has been growing investment into manufacturing (agro-processing, 
textiles, building materials, electronics), and services (telecommunications, finance, business 
services, hotels, restaurants).  For example, over 2009-2014, 44 percent of FDI projects in 
Africa were in services, 32 percent in manufacturing and 24 percent in the primary sector 
(UNCTAD, 2014).  The main extra-regional investor into Africa is Europe, followed by North 
America and Japan.   
Although the primary sector remains important for FDI in the Caribbean, there are also 
significant investment inflows into manufacturing and services.  Countries endowed with 
natural resources (such as gold, oil and gas) attract relatively higher FDI inflows, but sectors 
such as telecommunications, electricity, manufacturing and business financial services are also 
important.  The main sources of FDI are as for Africa.   
 
                                                          
2 UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2018. 
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Figure 1: FDI’s ratio to GDP (in %) for selected ACP states: 2010-2014 Average. 
(Source: Compiled using data from UNCTADstat) 
The main FDI source countries for the Pacific are the US, EU, and Australia.  Mining and 
quarrying and fisheries (specifically in Papua New Guinea and Fiji) are the main attractors in 
the primary sector; garment and food processing in manufacturing; while tourism, construction 
and business services dominate services.   
While never a major recipient of FDI, the ACP group has been active in forming trade 
partnerships. According to the WTO (2011), the ACP had 85 PTAs in force in 2010. Of these 
the African subgroup had 55 PTAs, of which 24 are intra-regional and 31 are cross-regional.  
Around 78 percent of these PTAs are with other developing countries.  Over the same time 
period, the Caribbean accumulated 19 PTAs (mainly cross-regional), of which 16 are with other 
developing countries, while the Pacific totalled 11 PTAs.   
Since PTAs were conventionally designed to address trade barriers, there exists an extensive 
empirical literature on their effects on trade (recent examples include Kohl & Trojanowska 
2015, Foster et al. 2011, and Hayakawa & Kimura, 2015).  However, the deep integration 
provisions have received much less investigation.  Although some scholars (eg. Baltagi et al, 
2008) have explored PTA effects on FDI in several regional agreements, the coverage of the 
ACP has been limited.  Most studies on individual ACP countries or sub-regional groups have 
confined themselves to the traditional determinants of FDI and have focused on African 
countries (eg. Bankole & Adewuyi 2013, Godfred et al 2015, Naude & Krugell 2007, Asiedu 
2002, Asiedu & Gyimah-Brempong, 2008, Muli & Aduda, 2017).   
Africa Caribbean Pacific 
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Our empirical analysis therefore adds to a relatively small literature on FDI in the ACP. We 
use panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 34 OECD countries into 45 ACP countries over the 
period 2000-2012.  This bilateral specification allows us to control for policy variables such as 
a PTA, a double tax treaty (DTT) or a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the OECD 
source and ACP host country, along with other control variables identified in the literature 
reviewed in the next section.  Our aim is to determine whether PTAs do in fact encourage FDI 
in the ACP countries viewed collectively. As we shall see there are good reasons for believing 
they might not. We then ask whether PTAs have the same implications for FDI in each of the 
three regional subgroups. We finish up by considering the interactions between BITs and PTAs 
and exploring the role of these two policies in more detail.   
2: Explaining Bilateral FDI 
There are two prominent theoretical frameworks on the determinants of FDI - the “eclectic or 
OLI paradigm” of Dunning (2001) and the ‘knowledge-capital model’ of Markusen (2013). 
Dunning argues that firms invest abroad to exploit three advantages related to ownership (O), 
location (L), and internalisation (I). The ownership specific advantages arise from intangible 
assets of a firm that gives it a competitive advantage despite being foreign.  The locational 
advantages are host country attributes such as resource endowments, trade and industrial 
policies, low cost inputs and a large market size. Host institutions may also matter (Ali et al., 
2010). Internalization advantages arise when the costs to the firm of outsourcing activity 
through product licensing or technical assistance more than offset the costs of engaging in 
production abroad itself (Casson, 2018).  The OLI framework therefore provides firm specific 
motivations for FDI (ownership and internalization) and host-country specific attractions 
(location).  The empirical literature has largely drawn on the implications of this framework in 
explaining the determinants of FDI, with market size claimed as the single most important 
factor (Chakarbarti, 2001). Some locational advantages attract different types of 
multinationals, with high trade costs and large market size more important for horizontal 
multinationals, while low trade costs and large factor price differences are important for 
vertical multinationals.   
The knowledge-capital model is grounded on three assumptions.  Firstly, the services of 
knowledge-based assets (including headquarter services such as R&D, marketing and 
management) are fragmented from production and can easily be supplied to separately located 
production plants.  Secondly, knowledge-based assets are skilled- whereas production is 
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unskilled-labor intensive.  These two assumptions imply incentives for vertical FDI, with firms 
locating activities based on countries’ relative factor endowments.  Finally, knowledge-based 
services can be used simultaneously by separately located production facilities. This provides 
an incentive for horizontal FDI, with affiliate firms replicating production for sale in multiple 
hosts.  
While the early theoretical work on FDI focussed on either vertical FDI (fragmented production 
process motivated by factor price differences) or horizontal FDI (replication of production 
processes abroad), the more recent literature (e.g. Ekholm et al 2007, Yeaple 2003, Markusen 
2013) has explained the presence of MNEs that are both horizontally and vertically integrated. 
Export-platform FDI involves an MNE producing in a host country and selling the output in 
the host and in third-country markets.   
Many empirical studies have sought to determine the locational factors important for attracting 
FDI, with market size, relatively low resource costs, low business risks, and resource 
availability found to be significant.  The limited empirical research that considers PTA effects 
on FDI can be grouped into case-studies of large well-known trade arrangements (e.g. NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR), and cross-country regression analyses.3  
Results from case-studies comparing FDI flows pre and post PTAs generally support an 
increase in FDI inflows following PTA formation. For example Blomstrom & Kokko,(1997) 
found a modest increase in FDI into Canada following the formation of CUSFTA, an increase 
in FDI inflows into Mexico following NAFTA, and in Argentina and Brazil following 
MERCOSUR.   
In a panel data regression framework, Feils & Rahman (2008) found that NAFTA had 
significant effects on regional FDI inflows, while Pain (1997) concluded that the EU Internal 
Market Program had significantly increased intra-EU FDI from UK firms, possibly at the 
expense of US-bound FDI.  These studies caution that the effects of PTAs on FDI are not 
automatic but depend on concurrent host-policy reforms and specific agreement provisions 
whose effects cannot be disentangled.   
                                                          
3 Each methodology has its strengths and weaknesses. Single country case studies have the advantage that the 
data is more likely to have been reported on a consistent basis and changes in some control variables (e.g. tax 
policy regimes etc.) can be observed and accommodated more readily. But empirical generalisations from such 
studies are limited to similar contexts. The conclusions of longitudinal studies are potentially more widely 
generalisable, but the data used is more likely to suffer from inconsistent reporting and researchers must 
often consign policy differences to host and source country fixed effects.  
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Cross-country analysis using gravity model techniques also provide support for a positive PTA-
FDI link. Cardamone & Scoppola (2012) used the knowledge-capital theory to assess the 
impact of all EU trade agreements (both trade and deep integration provisions) on the 
investment of EU firms in all (173) non-EU countries over the period 1995-2005.  They found 
a negative impact of EU tariffs, while the host country tariff effect differed across groups of 
partner countries. The deep integration provisions positively affected EU FDI.   
Medvedev (2011) found, using a panel of 153 countries, that PTA membership was associated 
with increased net FDI inflows during 1980-2004.  This is the most comprehensive study of 
PTA-FDI links because all PTAs are included.  However, the selection of net FDI inflows as 
the dependent variable has the drawback of precluding the estimation of bilateral flows and the 
influence of explanatory variables of interest in such a context.  Medvedev introduced two 
variables to capture surrounding market potential; the sum of the GDPs of PTA members and 
the average distance between host and all PTA members.  Both these variables were found to 
be positive and significant.   
Yeyati et al (2004) estimated an augmented gravity model on bilateral FDI flows from 20 
OECD countries into 60 host nations during 1982-1999.  Regional integration was captured by 
a dummy variable, with the GDPs of PTA members summed to capture the host’s extended 
market.  Both these variables were significant in explaining FDI. Jaumotte (2004) also finds a 
significant and positive effect of the extended market size created by mainly South-South PTAs 
on FDI inflows into a sample of 71 developing countries during 1980-1999.  Likewise, Buthe 
& Milner (2014) found that PTAs increased flows of FDI into 122 developing countries and 
that PTAs with investment clauses or dispute settlement mechanisms attract comparatively 
more FDI.    
Dee & Gali (2005) use a gravity equation to estimate the effects of trade and non-trade 
provisions of 18 PTAs on trade (among 116 countries over 1970-1997) and FDI inflows 
(among 77 countries over 1988-1997). While the use of subjective weights in their 
‘liberalisation index’ is a limitation, this work does acknowledge the differences in breadth and 
depth among different PTA’s, an aspect largely ignored in approaches using binary dummy 
variables.  Osnago et al. (2016) use information on the provision content of PTAs and find that 
deeper trade agreements increase vertical FDI.  
The bulk of the studies concentrating on the ACP have focused on African countries or African 
economic sub-groups, although little of this work has considered the role of PTAs in generating 
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FDI (Bankole & Adewayi, 2013). Most empirical work has focused on the effects of traditional 
host country characteristics such as market size, natural resources, infrastructure, governance 
and the investment environment (e.g. Bartels et al 2014, Godfred et al., 2015, Naude & Krugell, 
2007, Asiedu, 2002 and 2006). In a sample of 16 West African countries, Bankole & Adewuyi 
(2013) find support for the role of BITs in attracting FDI, but find no such role for PTAs. From 
a micro-economic perspective, Kinda (2013) provides evidence using firm-level data for 30 
SSA countries that horizontal FDI is encouraged by higher trade regulations and is sensitive to 
financial and human resource constraints, whereas vertical FDI is more responsive to 
infrastructure and institutional constraints.   
In the Caribbean setting, Kolstad & Villanger (2008) conclude that FDI inflows are particularly 
sensitive to political instability and are discouraged by stringent regulations, a finding they link 
to the presence of tax havens. Tuman & Emmert (2004) studied the determinants of US FDI 
into Latin American and Caribbean countries and found that stable, more open economies with 
higher growth and higher human capital attracted US FDI, while membership of a trade 
agreement had no effect. Gani & Clemes (2015) assess the factors attracting FDI into a panel 
of 9 Pacific Island countries, finding that the business environment (cost of doing business, 
legal rights etc.) is important for FDI.   
In the next section we draw on this review to select our variables and to anticipate the likely 
outcomes. While most of the variables that explain FDI elsewhere also explain FDI in the ACP 
countries, there are interesting differences as we shall see. It also turns out that there are 
differences across the African, Caribbean and Pacific subgroups. 
 
3: Econometric Specification & Data  
 
This study estimates an augmented gravity equation explaining bilateral FDI stocks between 
OECD sources and ACP hosts, using panel data from 2000-2017.  While traditionally used for 
explaining bilateral trade, the gravity equation works almost as well for bilateral FDI 
(Bergstrand & Egger, 2007).  Our equation specification is as follows: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                                          𝛽𝛽6𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +                                          𝛽𝛽12𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (1) 
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The dependent variable is the FDI stock (FDIijt) from each of the 34 OECD source countries 
(i) in each of the ACP host countries (j) in year t.  Altogether, there are 305 country pairs in 
our sample4.  The bilateral stock, rather than the flow, of FDI is selected as the dependent 
variable as it allows more country pairs to be included.  There is no consensus in the literature 
on the appropriateness of either measure, however, and both flow and stock data has been used.  
The FDI stocks do have the advantage of being a closer proxy for the level of activity of foreign 
firms in the host country (Stein & Daude, 2007; Wacker, 2016), and are less sensitive to single 
large transactions that can arise from mergers and acquisitions.5 
When it comes to identifying the determinants of inward FDI, we have the challenges of dealing 
with both the different forms of FDI – horizontal, vertical, export platform, and fragmented 
vertical - and the many potential channels through which a PTA could affect its location.  For 
example, the tariff-jumping motive for horizontal FDI could be eroded by a PTA which at the 
same time encouraged vertical FDI motivated by resource cost differences.   
Our explanatory variables are suggested by the literature and the UNCTAD’s categorisation of 
FDI determinants in its World Investment Report (2011). Equation (1) includes host country 
characteristics: market size (ACPGDPjt); trade openness (TOjt); investment risk (IRjt); resource 
abundance, captured by natural resource rent (NRRjt); human resource availability, captured 
by the labor force (LFjt); surrounding market potential (SMPjt); and the number of PTAs of 
which the host country is a member (NPTAjt).  Also included are the source country GDP 
(OECDGDPit) and dummies denoting bilateral treaties such as a BIT, a PTA or a DTT.  
Additionally we control for the bilateral distance (Distij) and time difference in the form of the 
‘overlap in office hours’ (OHij) between each country pair.  αi, αj and αt are unobserved source, 
host and time specific effects, respectively, and εijt is the stochastic error term.  The explanatory 
variables used in our model and their expected relation to FDI are summarised in Table 1. 
Appendix Table A4 presents the summary statistics of all non-dummy variables used in our 
estimation.   
 
 
                                                          
4 See Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for the number of partners for each ACP and OECD country. We consider 
only positive FDI stocks.   
5 Wacker (2016) reviews the alternative measures of the activities of multinational corporations and concludes 
that “foreign direct investment (FDI) stock data is indeed a good proxy for measuring most real economic 
activities of multinational firms”. Bellack (1998) and Lipsey (2007) also provide detailed discussions of the 
issues involved in the choice of stocks over flows and the measurement of FDI in general.  
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Table 1: Description and Source of Variables  
Variable Description Source   
Dependent Variable   
FDI* Foreign Direct Investment 
Stock of OECD country into 
ACP country, in millions of 
USD. 
International 
Direct 
Investment 
Statistics 
database: OECD  
  
Independent Variables Expected 
Sign 
Reference 
Host GDP* 
(ACPGDP) 
ACP country GDP, PPP 
(constant 2011 international 
$) 
WDI + Chakrabarti 
(2001) 
Source GDP* 
(OECDGDP) 
OECD country GDP, PPP 
(constant 2011 international 
$) 
WDI + Chakrabarti 
(2001) 
Host Labor 
Force* (LF) 
Size of labor force of host 
country.   
WDI + Noorbuksh et al 
(1999) 
Host Trade 
Openness 
(TO) 
Share of exports and imports 
of goods and services as a % 
of GDP of the ACP country 
WDI +/-  
Host Natural 
resource rent* 
(NRR) 
Sum of the natural resource 
(oil, natural gas, coal, 
mineral, forest) rents 
received by ACP country as 
a % of GDP 
WDI + Asiedu, 2006 
Host Investment 
risk* 
(IR) 
A measure of economic 
freedom based on both 
quantitative and qualitative 
factors 
Heritage 
Foundation 
+ Blonigen et al, 
2007 
Bilateral PTA Preferential Trade 
Agreement  
WTO +/-  
Bilateral BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty UNCTAD + Hallward-
Driemeier, 2003 
Bilateral DTT Double Taxation Treaty UNCTAD + Barthel et al 
(2009) and  
Bilateral 
Distance* 
(Dist) 
Bilateral Great circle 
distance (in kilometres) 
CEPII +/- Head et al 
(2009);  
Bilateral Time 
difference (OH) 
Overlap in office hours  www.timeandda
te.com 
+ 
 
Stein & Daude 
(2007) 
Host 
Surrounding 
Market 
Potential* 
(SMP) 
The sum of inverse-distance 
weighted GDPs of nearby 
markets.  (See Appendix for 
details on calculation)   
GDP Data from 
WDI 
Distance from 
CEPII 
+ Medvedev 
(2011); 
Blonigen et al 
(2007)  
Host number of 
PTAs (NPTA) 
The total number of PTAs of 
which the host is a member  
WTO +/- Buthe & Milner 
(2008) 
Note: * indicates variables transformed by logs. 
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Two explanatory variables deserve further comment. Distance may encourage FDI as an 
alternative to exports due to transportation costs, but it may also reduce FDI prospects, if 
unfamiliarity with laws, institutions and culture increase with distance.  As such, the expected 
sign on this variable is ambiguous. While the importance of geographical distance is well 
recognised in empirical models of FDI, less attention has been paid to the economic effects of 
time zone differences, which matter for activities that are intensive in information and require 
frequent interaction. While new communications technologies have reduced the financial cost 
of distant interaction, they cannot overcome the problem of time difference. Head et al (2009) 
call this the ‘synchronization effect’, which has a negative effect on FDI location. But they also 
highlight a ‘continuity effect’ that arises because branches operating in separate time zones 
allow a company to be active over a longer part of the day. Since these effects oppose each 
other, the link between time difference and FDI is ambiguous. In order to differentiate these 
effects we include as our measure of time difference, the number of office hours (assumed to 
be from 9am to 5pm) that overlap between host and source country. A positive sign then 
indicates that the synchronization effect dominates, a negative sign that it is the continuity 
effect that prevails.  
 
4: Empirical Analysis: Results and Discussion.6 
A natural starting point in a panel regression is pooled OLS which regresses the dependent 
variable on an intercept and the explanatory variables using both the cross-sectional and time 
variation in the data.  But the ACP states consist of rather heterogeneous groups of countries, 
suggesting the likelihood of unmeasured country-specific characteristics that are not captured 
by our explanatory variables, in which case pooled OLS (which ignores these fixed effects) 
yields biased and inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2008).  Country fixed effects were therefore 
introduced via a dummy variable for each host (ACP) and source (OECD) country7 and (1) 
was estimated by OLS with robust standard errors. Empirical tests on the residuals revealed 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, which are often of concern in panel data 
                                                          
6 An issue that arises with the use of macroeconomic time series data is that of stationarity, but as discussed in 
the Econometric Appendix we are able to rule out any concerns about spurious regressions here.  
7 The F test on the significance of country fixed effects rejected the null hypothesis of no significant difference 
across countries (F = 27.46, p=0.00) at the 5 percent level of significance, indicating that pooled OLS is not 
appropriate. 
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due to the inclusion of both time and cross-country information.8  Furthermore, because of 
concerns in the literature on endogeneity (through two way causality) between the dependent 
and independent variables in an FDI equation, we tested for such possibilities for the variables 
ACPGDP and trade openness. The results indicate that endogeneity should not be an issue in 
our sample. 9  
Equation (1) was re-estimated using the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimator, 
which allows us to simultaneously account for the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Medvedev, 2011), and Table 2 presents the results. Three alternative 
specifications of the BIT and PTA dummies are considered. Column (1) includes single PTA 
and BIT dummies, while (2) includes separate regional PTA dummies and (3) does the same 
for the BIT dummy (Africa and Caribbean only).  
Table 2: FGLS estimation: base model and decomposition of PTA and BIT by region 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) 
ACP GDP ⱹ 1.560*** 
(0.127) 
1.494*** 
(0.120) 
1.560*** 
(0.127) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.379 
 (0.280) 
0.478* 
(0.269) 
0.381 
(0.277) 
TO  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
IR ⱹ 0.404** 
(0.185) 
0.467*** 
(0.171) 
0.374** 
(0.179) 
NRR ⱹ 0.003 
(0.022) 
0.012 
(0.021) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
LF ⱹ 0.119 
(0.209) 
0.168 
(0.201) 
0.121 
(0.206) 
SMP ⱹ 0.080 
(0.063) 
0.099 
(0.063) 
0.088 
(0.062) 
Dist ⱹ -0.899*** 
(0.260) 
-0.973*** 
(0.265) 
-0.893*** 
(0.266) 
OH 0.080* 
(0.041) 
0.134*** 
(0.041) 
0.086** 
(0.041) 
                                                          
8 The Breusch Pagan test results for heteroscedasticity (χ2 = 86.25, p =0.00) rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity at the 5 percent level of significance.  The Woodridge test for autocorrelation indicated the 
presence of serially correlated residuals (F (1,267) = 78.4, p=0.00). 
9 A common problem in testing endogeneity is the identification of valid instruments for the endogenous variables.  
A valid instrument should be highly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable but not with the error 
term, and we used a one period lag of the suspect endogenous variables as an instrument to test for possible 
endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The null hypothesis of exogenous variables was not rejected for 
host GDP or trade openness (see Table A8). Other variables that may give rise to endogeneity problems are PTA 
and BIT, but due to the difficulty in obtaining valid instruments for these variables and the inappropriateness of 
using their lagged forms, we do not test for their exogeneity here.     
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BIT 0.034 
(0.076) 
0.055 
(0.078) 
 
DTT 1.193*** 
(0.104) 
1.279*** 
(0.107) 
1.181*** 
(0.104) 
PTA -0.157 
(0.162) 
 -0.144 
(0.163) 
NPTA 0.029 
(0.033) 
0.031 
(0.032) 
0.013 
(0.031) 
PTA-Africa   -0.558*** 
(0.169) 
 
PTA-Caribbean  0.995*** 
(0.333) 
 
PTA-Pacific   1.171 
(0.779) 
 
BIT-Africa    -0.033 
(0.122) 
BIT-Caribbean    0.050 
(0.285) 
Constant -18.614*** 
(4.067) 
-19.572*** 
(3.993) 
-18.702*** 
(4.042) 
Notes: Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  Standard errors are in 
brackets.   
 
All regressions in Table 2 confirm that host economy size has a significant positive effect on 
FDI, but surrounding market potential has no significant effect for this aggregate of countries. 
Greater investment risk (a lower value of the index), has a significant, negative effect on FDI. 
The negative coefficient on Dist suggests that FDI, like trade, is discouraged by unfamiliarity 
with the laws, institutions and cultures of more distant countries. In terms of resource 
endowments, both NRR and LF have the expected sign, but are not significant. The overlap in 
office hours is positive and significant in all equations, indicating the dominance of the 
synchronization effect noted earlier. Source country GDP is only significant in equation 210. 
Turning to the effects of international treaties, the presence of a DTT has a significant and 
positive effect as expected. The insignificant coefficient on the BIT dummy, which persists 
even when we introduce separate regional dummies for Africa and the Caribbean11, is 
consistent with some other results in the literature (Aisbett, 2009; Bellak, 2013). Falvey & 
Foster-McGregor (2018) find that the significant impact of BITs is in establishing new bilateral 
FDI links rather than expanding existing relationships. However, given that BITs are widely 
                                                          
10 Given the possibility of a lagged effect of GDP (host or parent) on current FDI, we included a one-year lag of 
these variables and re-estimated our base model.  Neither variable was significant, with very little change in the 
other coefficients.   
11 In the Pacific, only PNG is signatory to a BIT. 
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used instruments for protecting and attracting FDI, we explore the relationship between BITs 
and FDI further below.   
Hosts who are members of more PTAs do not necessarily receive more FDI, other things equal, 
which is consistent with the insignificant result on openness. The presence of a bilateral PTA 
has no significant impact on bilateral FDI. Trade can be a complement or substitute for FDI, 
depending on the type of FDI, and it is not implausible that the diverse ACP group attracts a 
variety of types. To investigate if aggregation masks any significant sub-group PTA-FDI 
relationships, we regionalise our PTA dummy, and re-estimate. While the estimated 
coefficients on the other variables are largely unaffected12, regionalisation of the PTA variable 
reveals significant differences across the sub-groups.  In Africa, the PTA variable is negative 
and significant, indicating that as African countries open their markets through PTAs, source 
country firms prefer to trade rather than to invest. The opposite appears to be true in the 
Caribbean, where PTAs significantly encourage FDI.  However, there is no evidence of any 
PTA-FDI relation for the Pacific.   
To further investigate any regional patterns, Table 3 presents the results from estimating 
equation 1 on our regional sub-samples. Caution is warranted in drawing conclusions from 
these results because of the reduction in sample size, particularly for the Pacific.   
 
Table 3: FGLS estimation results by regions 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors Africa Caribbean Pacific 
ACP GDP ⱹ 1.480*** 
(0.171) 
0.029 
(0.346) 
-0.549 
(0.739) 
OECD GDP ⱹ -0.388 
(0.345) 
0.009 
(0.759) 
2.359*** 
(0.879) 
TO ⱹ -0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
IR ⱹ 0.480** 
(0.237) 
0.775 
(0.489) 
1.198* 
(0.641) 
NRR ⱹ 0.021 
(0.042) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
0.005 
(0.117) 
LF ⱹ -0.026 
(0.016) 
2.561*** 
(0.615) 
1.055** 
(0.582) 
SMPⱹ 0.689*** 
(0.178) 
0.033 
(0.096) 
-0.336 
(0.232) 
                                                          
12 Except that OECD GDP becomes significant. 
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Dist ⱹ -0.747** 
(0.339) 
-1.073 
(1.242) 
-12.353*** 
(4.109) 
OH 0.140* 
(0.079) 
0.362 
(0.374) 
1.850*** 
(0.392) 
NPTA 0.037 
(0.056) 
-0.027 
(0.062) 
0.014 
(0.093) 
BIT 0.035 
(0.090) 
0.271 
(0.179) 
 
DTT 1.032*** 
(0.116) 
1.045** 
(0.464) 
6.649*** 
(1.169) 
PTA -0.355* 
(0.193) 
-0.027 
(0.437) 
0.415 
(1.170) 
Constant -18.589*** 
(4.346) 
-25.484** 
(15.903) 
80.363** 
(39.366) 
N 2181 550 131 
Notes: Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  Standard errors are in 
brackets.   
 
 
 
 
 
Despite marginal changes, the coefficient estimates for Africa (2181 observations on 212 
country pairs) have the same signs and significance as in the base model, except that 
surrounding-market potential is now significant and positive.  It seems FDI in Africa is 
encouraged by a larger host economy with strong surrounding market potential, low investment 
risk, a high office-hours overlap and a DTT between host and source.  A bilateral PTA 
discourages FDI consistent with Table 2.  
The Caribbean estimates (550 observations on 57 country pairs) show greater differences from 
the base estimation.  For these countries FDI is unaffected by their individual market sizes, 
distance, and willingness to grant preferential access, both bilaterally and in general. But FDI 
is attracted by the availability of labor and a DTT. For these countries greater openness (TO) 
discourages FDI consistent with the substitution of trade for FDI in more open economies. 
Contrary to Table 2, a PTA has no significant effect on FDI in the Caribbean.  
Similarly, neither host market size nor surrounding market potential appears to attract FDI in 
the Pacific (131observations on 18 country pairs). Multinational firms from large OECD 
countries are more likely to invest in the Pacific. They are encouraged by a larger host labor 
force or a DTT, but are discouraged by investment risks, distance and a small overlap in office 
hours.  
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Such mixed results for the PTA variable and the absence of any significant effects for the BIT 
variable leads us to consider the overlap between them, distinguishing between PTAs that 
contain foreign investment and dispute settlement provisions (PTA+IP) and those that do not 
(PTA-IP).  BITs and investment provisions in PTAs have filled a policy void arising from the 
absence of multilateral protection of investment equivalent to the WTO protections of trade 
(Swenson, 2009).  We expect PTA’s with these provisions to attract more FDI. But we are also 
interested in how such provisions relate to a BIT. Are the two substitutes or do they target 
different types of FDI? The estimation results are shown in Table 4.   
The estimates for the full ACP group are consistent with the base model - neither PTAs with 
investment provisions nor those without impact on FDI.  For Africa, PTA+IP has a significant 
negative effect on FDI.  Perhaps the FDI encouraged by these investment provisions facilitates 
trade and acts as a substitute for other FDI. Both coefficients are insignificant for the Pacific; 
while PTA-IP encourages FDI in the Caribbean. There is no evidence here that investment 
provisions in PTAs encourages FDI in any of these regional groupings.13  
Table 4: FGLS estimation results: Decomposition of PTA by provision 
Dependent variable Log (FDI) 
Regressors ACP Africa Caribbean Pacific 
ACP GDP ⱹ 1.550*** 
(0.127) 
1.482*** 
(0.173) 
0.040 
(0.334) 
-0.549 
(0.739) 
OECD GDP ⱹ 0.402 
(0.279) 
-0.368 
(0.349) 
-0.025 
(0.737) 
2.359*** 
(0.879) 
TO  -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
IR ⱹ 0.420** 
(0.181) 
0.534** 
(0.240) 
0.938* 
(0.502) 
-1.198* 
(0.641) 
NRR ⱹ 0.005 
(0.022) 
0.010 
(0.042) 
0.014 
(0.030) 
0.005 
(0.117) 
LF ⱹ 0.133 
(0.208) 
-0.029 
(0.017) 
2.228*** 
(0.603) 
1.055* 
(0.582) 
SMPⱹ 0.089 
(0.063) 
0.724*** 
(0.178) 
0.014 
(0.099) 
-0.336 
(0.232) 
NPTA  0.022 
(0.032) 
0.043 
(0.056) 
-0.010 
(0.062) 
0.014 
(0.093) 
Dist ⱹ -0.909*** 
(0.268) 
-0.652** 
(0.349) 
-2.541** 
(1.165) 
-12.353*** 
(4.110) 
OH 0.081* 
(0.041) 
0.146* 
(0.082) 
0.009 
(0.356) 
1.850*** 
(0.392) 
                                                          
13 The splitting of the PTA dummy in this way does affect some coefficients in our two smaller regional 
samples. Investment risk becomes positive and significant in the Caribbean, but switches to negative and 
significant in the Pacific. Distance is now also negative and significant in the Caribbean.    
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BIT 0.032 
(0.077) 
0.022 
(0.089) 
0.067 
(0.200) 
 
 
DTT 1.186*** 
(0.105) 
1.072*** 
(0.119) 
1.432*** 
(0.543) 
6.649*** 
(1.169) 
PTA+IP -0.123 
(0.234) 
-0.694** 
(0.294) 
0.198 
(0.446) 
-0.415 
(1.169) 
PTA-IP -0.175 
(0.168) 
-0.311 
(0.200) 
2.000** 
(0.948) 
0.113 
(5.408) 
Constant -19.021*** 
(4.102) 
-20.419*** 
(4.442) 
-7.758* 
(15.168) 
88.996** 
(39.949) 
Notes: Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  Standard errors are in 
brackets.   
 
Given the popularity of BITs as a policy device for attracting investment and the mixed 
empirical findings on their success both here and in the literature, we decided to broaden the 
investigation of BITs.  As there are few BITs in effect in the Pacific, we confine attention to 
the Africa and the Caribbean sub-groups and consider them separately. The signs and 
significance of the estimated coefficients on the control variables in Table 5 are mostly 
consistent with our previous results, except that distance and overlap in office hours become 
insignificant in both Africa and the Caribbean. The significant negative effect of TO again 
implies that Caribbean countries which are more open to trade are less attractive to FDI.  
In Table 5 we interact BIT separately with PTA-IP and PTA+IP and include all these variables 
in the regressions. There is no evidence of a significant positive effect of a BIT on FDI into 
Africa, although when the BIT is combined with a PTA without investment provisions it partly 
offsets the significant negative effect of this PTA on FDI. A PTA with investment provisions 
has no significant effect on FDI, except if it is supported by a BIT when it has a significant 
negative effect. This reinforces the view that the investment provisions in PTAs in Africa are 
not about attracting FDI in general. In a region where trade and FDI appear to be substitutes, it 
seems that these investment provisions may be designed to facilitate trade-enhancing FDI at 
the expense of FDI more generally. 
Conversely, the significant positive coefficient on PTA-IP suggests that trade and FDI are 
complements in the Caribbean. However, when employed in combination with a BIT, this 
positive effect is almost halved, as the BIT rather perversely seems to discourage the type of 
FDI attracted by the PTA. A PTA with investment provisions has no significant effect on FDI 
unless it is employed in combination with a BIT when there is some evidence of a significant 
positive effect.  
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It has been claimed that BITs, like PTAs, may also have signalling and commitment effects 
that affect other FDI relationships. In Table 5, we test this by adding NBIT which indicates the 
total number of BITs signed by the host country. We do not find any such effect in Africa or 
the Caribbean. Since the FDI sources in our sample are all OECD countries, regressions (3) 
and (6) in Table 5 examine whether this signalling is confined to BITs with OECD countries. 
Our results reveal this to be the case for the Caribbean. An increase in the number of BITs with 
OECD countries provides greater confidence to OECD investors in general in this region. 
However, for African countries, while more BIT’s with OECD countries does not matter much, 
their involvement in BIT’s with countries other than OECD members increases overall OECD 
investor confidence in investment in Africa.   
Table 5: FGLS estimation results: Further analysis of of BITs 
Regressors Africa 
(1)                 (2)                   (3) 
Caribbean 
          (4)                    (5)                  (6) 
ACP GDP ⱹ 1.428*** 
(0.174) 
1.380*** 
(0.175) 
1.394*** 
(0.181) 
0.212 
(0.338) 
0.068 
(0.344) 
-0.221 
(0.367) 
OECD GDP ⱹ -0.382 
(0.364) 
-0.433 
(0.378) 
-0.414 
(0.372) 
-0.363 
(0.728) 
0.396 
(0.745) 
-0.344 
(0.769) 
TO  -0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
IR 0.506** 
(0.240) 
0.547** 
(0.240) 
0.554** 
(0.241) 
0.817* 
(0.473) 
0.967** 
(0.491) 
0.964* 
(0.514) 
NRR 0.035 
(0.050) 
0.035 
(0.050) 
0.035 
(0.050) 
-0.005 
(0.044) 
0.002 
(0.045) 
-0.012 
(0.045) 
LF  -0.025 
(0.017) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
1.706*** 
(0.581) 
2.028*** 
(0.556) 
2.492*** 
(0.574) 
SMP 0.750*** 
(0.178) 
0.631*** 
(0.186) 
0.579*** 
(0.189) 
0.027 
(0.095) 
0.041 
(0.095) 
0.015 
(0.096) 
Distⱹ -0.572 
(0.347) 
-0.479 
(0.330) 
-0.467 
(0.328) 
-1.141 
(1.218) 
-0.958 
(1.198) 
-0.771 
(1.272) 
OH 0.111 
(0.085) 
0.118 
(0.085) 
0.127 
(0.086) 
0.469 
(0.373) 
0.525 
(0.377) 
0.580 
(0.392) 
DTT 1.051*** 
(0.123) 
1.114*** 
(0.121) 
1.136*** 
(0.122) 
1.990*** 
(0.559) 
1.862*** 
(0.551) 
1.716*** 
(0.562) 
PTA+IP -0.284 
(0.360) 
-0.226 
(0.355) 
-0.228 
(0.356) 
0.610 
(0.436) 
0.050 
(0.431) 
0.285 
(0.461) 
PTA-IP  -0.719*** 
(0.268) 
-0.746*** 
(0.264) 
-0.733*** 
(0.265) 
3.386*** 
(0.945) 
3.223*** 
(0.945) 
3.279*** 
(0.994) 
NPTA 0.051 
(0.057) 
0.020 
(0.050) 
0.001 
(0.059) 
-0.011 
(0.061) 
-0.048 
(0.064) 
-0.089 
(0.067) 
BIT 0.053 
(0.099) 
0.049 
(0.102) 
0.050 
(0.106) 
-0.022 
(0.218) 
0.057 
(0.230) 
-0.270 
(0.231) 
NBIT  0.017 
(0.010) 
  0.034 
(0.029) 
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BIT*PTA+IP -0.531** 
(0.265) 
-0.614** 
(0.264) 
-0.601** 
(0.265) 
0.455 
(0.466) 
0.486 
(0.470) 
0.857* 
(0.486) 
BIT*PTA-IP 0.567** 
(0.243) 
0.565** 
(0.237) 
0.565** 
(0.236) 
-1.768* 
(0.959) 
-1.737* 
(0.938) 
-1.725* 
(0.999) 
N of OECD 
BITs 
  0.009 
(0.024) 
  0.125*** 
(0.046) 
N of other 
BITs 
  0.029** 
(0.011) 
  -0.082 
(0.053) 
BIT* NRR -0.046 
(0.047) 
-0.044 
(0.047) 
-0.047 
(0.047) 
0.018 
(0.056) 
0.028 
(0.058) 
0.042 
(0.058) 
Constant -20.153*** 
(4.534) 
-18.608*** 
(4.516) 
-18.403*** 
(4.478) 
-11.674 
(15.511) 
-16.487 
(15.470) 
-22.415 
(15.905) 
Notes: Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ Control variables that are expressed in natural logarithms.  Standard errors are in 
brackets.   
 
Finally, the regressions in Table 5 also explore whether BITs are of particular importance in 
the natural resources sector. Some authors have emphasised that the risk of expropriation may 
be higher (e.g. Aisbett 2009 and Tobin & Busch 2010) in this sector, while others have noted 
that BITs may be irrelevant if hosts and foreign investors find alternative ways to protect their 
interests (Hajzler 2014).14 To investigate this we introduce an interaction variable (BIT*NRR).  
Since its coefficient is insignificant, our results offer no support for the general notion that BITs 
stimulate FDI in resource-abundant ACP countries.  
 
5: Summary and Conclusions 
This study examined the determinants of bilateral FDI from OECD source countries into ACP 
host countries, with a focus on the role of PTAs. Our estimating equation included standard 
variables identified in the literature as important for explaining FDI, plus additional 
determinants including a measure of surrounding market potential and the office hours overlap 
between source and host.   
Our empirical investigations confirmed the importance of domestic market size in attracting 
foreign investors, for the ACP overall and the African and Caribbean subsamples. This 
indicates a prevalence of market-seeking FDI and shows that FDI into the ACP is not just about 
natural resources. Surrounding market potential was only significant for the African subsample, 
                                                          
14 Yackee (2009) notes the prevalence of sophisticated investment contracts in the natural resources and 
infrastructure concession sectors, which provide more deal-specific provisions than the ambiguous one-size-fits 
all BIT provisions.   
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but this does support the importance of regional integration to unlock the market potential in 
this otherwise rather fragmented group of countries. FDI into the ACP is sensitive to investment 
risks. Both greater bilateral distance and a smaller office-hours overlap reduce FDI, the latter 
demonstrating that the synchronization effect dominates the continuity effect. The presence of 
a double tax treaty has a significant and positive impact on FDI in the ACP and each of its three 
subregions.   
Decomposition of the ACP group into its regional subsamples revealed differences in the 
patterns of significant explanatory variables. While the small sample sizes for the Caribbean 
and Pacific subgroups, particularly the latter, suggest caution in drawing inferences, it does 
seem that foreign investors in the different regions may have quite different motivations. We 
can offer no support here for any notion that the ACP may benefit from developing common 
policies for attracting FDI.  
While encouraging FDI is not the premier aim of a PTA, it often appears as a secondary 
objective. However, our only evidence that PTAs encourage FDI is confined to PTAs without 
investment provisions in the Caribbean. PTAs both with and without investment provisions 
seem to discourage FDI in Africa. There is no evidence of any significant effect in the Pacific. 
It seems that the FDI affected by PTAs is a substitute for trade in Africa and a complement to 
trade in the Caribbean. Perhaps the investment provisions are designed to attract small 
investments of a trade facilitating type which are insufficient in volume to offset the trade-
substituting FDI that the PTA displaces in Africa. But resolving this issue awaits the 
availability of more disaggregated FDI data.  
Consistent with some other studies, we found no evidence that a bilateral BIT encouraged FDI 
in the full ACP sample or the African and Caribbean sub-samples. To explore further we 
interacted BIT with two variables denoting the presence of a bilateral PTA, with and without 
investment provisions. In Africa a BIT in combination with a PTA generates a positive effect 
on FDI only if that PTA is without investment provisions. This reinforces the view that the 
investment provisions in a PTA and a BIT are somehow aimed at different types of investments 
in Africa. In the Caribbean there was some evidence of a positive effect if the PTA contained 
investment provisions, but the effect was negative in their absence. A similar interaction 
between BITs and a host’s resource rent earnings produced nothing of significance. What 
further analysis did reveal was a possible signalling role for BITs, however, restricted to BITs 
signed with OECD countries in the Caribbean and countries outside the OECD in Africa.   
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Data Appendix 
Table A1: List of ACP countries 
AFRICA: Angola, Cape Verde, Comoros, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,  
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South 
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe 
CARIBBEAN: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago 
PACIFIC: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu 
 
Table A2: Number of ACP partners for each OECD country 
OECD Country (# ACP partners) 
Australia  (4) Finland  (1) Japan (1) Slovenia  (4) 
Austria  (1) France  (38) Korea  (27) Spain  (3) 
Belgium  (4) Germany  (13) Mexico  (1) SR  (1) 
Canada  (8) Greece  (6) Netherlands  (38) Sweden  (5) 
Chile  (2) Hungary  (3) Norway  (26) Switzerland  (3) 
Denmark  (15) Iceland  (1) NZ  (3) UK  (18) 
Estonia  (3) Italy  (43) Portugal  (4) US  (28) 
 
Table A3: Number of OECD partners for each ACP country 
ACP country (# OECD Partners) 
Angola (10) Dominican Rep.  (15) Mauritania  (3) St Lucia  (4) 
Bahamas (11) Equatorial Guinea  (5) Mauritius  (10) St Vincent & Grenadines  (3) 
Barbados (8) Ethiopia  (7) Mozambique  (8) Tanzania  (9) 
Belize  (7) Fiji  (7) Niger  (4) Togo  (6) 
Benin  (6)                Gabon  (6) Nigeria  (13) Tonga  (3) 
Burkina Faso  (4) Gambia  (3) Papua New Guinea  
 
Trinidad & Tobago  (8)   
Burundi  (2) Ghana  (11) Rwanda  (3) Uganda  (9) 
Cameroon  (8) Kenya  (13) Samoa  (3) Vanuatu  (4) 
Cent. African Rep. (3) Liberia  (10) Senegal  (5) Zimbabwe  (8) 
Chad  (3) Madagascar  (4) Sierra Leone  (6)  
Congo  (5) Malawi  (6) Solomon Is.  (2)  
Cuba  (4) Mali  (4) South Africa  (24)  
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Calculation of Surrounding Market Potential 
 
Our approach follows the Blonigen et al (2007) measure of surrounding market potential except 
that we only include other countries within a specific sub-region, rather than all countries 
everywhere.  The sub-regions are defined as the five economic groupings of the African 
countries (West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern & Southern Africa, Eastern African Countries), 
the Caribbean and the Pacific.  The weights are calculated as a simple inverse function where 
the shortest bilateral distance within the region is assigned weight of 1, and all other bilateral 
distances receive a weight that declines as per the equation below: 
 weightij = (shortest bilateral distance kj)/(bilateral distanceij) 
where distanceij is the distance between country i and j, and the closest country to j in that 
region is k. This weight is then multiplied by the GDP (PPP) of country i.  The inverse distance 
weighted GDP of all other countries (excluding j) in the sub-region of country j are summed to 
give the surrounding market potential of country j.   
 
Table A4: Summary Statistics 
Variable (in values) Mean St Deviation Maximum Minimum 
FDI (US$M)* 948.4 4047.5 63654 -1459.8 
ACP GDP (PPP, $M)* 56802 140242 1027416 451 
OECD GDP (PPP, $M)* 1475113 2875518 17652819 9448 
TO (%) 78.6 35.5 351.1 20.7 
IR* 55.5 9.1 77.0 21.4 
NRR (% of GDP)* 14.4 18.1 100.4 0 
LF (millions)*  6.73 
 
10.0 
 
59 
 
0.04 
 NPTA 3.3 
 
1.1 
 
6 1 
SMP* (PPP,$M)* 152933 178625 1086846 2806 
Distance* 7559 3140 17615 1482 
OH 5.0 2.8 8.0 0 
*Variables transformed into logs in all estimations.  ACP GDP, TO, IR, NRR, LF, SMP and NPTA are host country specific variables and are 
averaged over the host countries and not as country pair variables. A similar treatment applies to OECD GDP, while Dist, OH and FDI are 
averaged as country pair variables. 
 
 
Econometric Appendix  
 
Tests for stationarity  
 
The Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) unit root test is used as it allows the autocorrelation coefficient to 
vary across cross-sections.  It calculates a standardised t-bar test statistic based on the averaged 
augmented Dickey Fuller statistics for panels (Im et al, 2003).  The results are summarised in 
Table A5, where the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all variables except for ACP 
GDP, OECD GDP and SMP.  With the dependent variable (FDI) as a stationary process, the 
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inclusion of these three non-stationary variables does not raise concerns of spurious 
correlation15.  Moreover, two of these non-stationary variables (ACP GDP and SMP) are also 
cointegrated (see Table A6), and the residuals from the FGLS estimation of equation 1 are 
stationary (see Table A7).   
Table A5: Panel Unit Root Test – IPS  
Variable Statistic Variable Statistic 
Log(FDI)ⱹ -3.1193*** Log NRR -1.3668** 
Log(ACP GDP) -2.1436 TO  -1.8348** 
Log(OECD GDP) -1.1542 Log IR  -2.3677*** 
Log(LF) -1.9588*** Log SMP  -1.5708 
Significance levels: *10%  **5%  ***1%.  ⱹ includes constant and trend.  Automatic lag selection based on Schwarz Information Criterion.   
Table A6: Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test (ACP GDP and SMP) 
 Panel Statistic Group Statistic 
Variance-Statistic 1.8327**  
rho-Statistic 2.3413 3.2914 
PP-Statistic -0.8309*** -1.7199** 
ADF Statistic -0.5274*** -4.9392*** 
The Pedroni (1999) Residual Cointegration test employs 4 panel statistics and 3 group statistics, reported above.  It tests the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration.  * denotes the significance level - * 10%, **5%, ***1%.  The null of 
no cointegration is rejected in 3 panel statistics and two of the group statistics, providing evidence of cointegration between ACP GDP and 
SMP which are both host country variables. Because our dataset has country pair dummies, we have treated these host country variables as 
host variables and not country pair variables.   
 
 
Table A7: Unit root test on residuals of base equation 
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -23.416  0.0000 257  2226 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
IPS W-stat  -9.06945  0.0000  237  2166 
 
 
Table A8: Endogeneity test results 
Variable Results 
Host GDP χ2 =0.181019 p=0.6705 
F=0.175205  p=0.6756 
TO χ2 =0.691901  p=0.4055 
F=0.67651  p=0.4109 
 
Fixed or Random effects? The unobserved country specific factors can be incorporated into the 
estimation through a fixed effects model (FEM) or a random effects model (REM).  In a FEM, 
these unobserved characteristics are subsumed in the intercept and hence each country has a 
different intercept, while in a REM they are considered as part of the error term (Baltagi, 2008).  
                                                          
15 We re-estimated our equation after first-differencing the three non-stationary variables, and except for the coefficient size of ACP GDP and 
OECD GDP, the magnitude and significance of all other variables show very little difference.   
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The time invariant individual specific effects are allowed to be correlated with the regressors 
in a FEM whereas they are purely random in a REM.  The Hausman specification test (χ2 = 
72.59, p = 0.00) rejects the null hypothesis that a REM provides consistent estimates and hence, 
the FEM is selected. Year effects are jointly insignificant (F=1.35, p=0.16) at the 5% level and 
hence a one way FEM is estimated. Additionally, the FEM is an appropriate specification when 
the focus is on a specific set of countries making inference conditional on these observed 
countries (Baltagi (2008)).16   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 A FEM can be estimated in different ways, including within-transformation, between-effects or LSDV 
approach. The latter was chosen as it allows time invariant variables to be included.  
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